Abstract: Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without receiving adequate compensation. This project seeks to measure and compare how well authorities in 56 countries controlled bank risk shifting during the 1990s. Although significant risk shifting occurs on average, substantial variation exists in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. We find that the tendency for explicit deposit insurance to exacerbate risk shifting is tempered by incorporating loss-control features such as risksensitive premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance. Introducing explicit deposit insurance has had adverse effects in environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption. 
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How Country and Deposit Insurance Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting
Credible deposit insurance offers benefits to short-horizoned policymakers and politicians. It can eliminate the threat of depositor runs and protect small depositors without its full economic cost immediately registering on the government budget. Part of the cost of deposit insurance is that it reduces incentives for depositors to monitor and police their banks. In countries that have not introduced deposit insurance explicitly, insurance is implicit. The costs and benefits society experiences from either type of guarantees depend on how effectively government regulators can control bank riskshifting (Buser, Chen, and Kane, 1981; Brickley and James, 1988; Calomiris, 1992; Kane, 1995; Honohan and Klingebiel, 2001 ).
Risk-shifting occurs whenever a contractual counterparty is exposed to loss from fraud, leverage or earnings volatility without being adequately compensated for the risk entailed. Other things equal, a bank can shift risk onto its deposit insurer in two principal ways: by increasing its leverage and by increasing the volatility of its return on assets.
Risk-shifting is subsidized whenever the value of the explicit and implicit deposit guarantees a country's banks enjoy exceeds the implicit and explicit premiums the insurer imposes on them. To avoid subsidizing bank risk taking, a deposit insurer must monitor and police both activities appropriately.
The empirical literature on bank risk-shifting begins with Marcus and Shaked (1984) . They use a one-year put option model to estimate a risk-adjusted "fair" value for a bank's deposit insurance premium. The authors find that on average FDIC insurance was overpriced, but that the distribution of fair premiums was strongly skewed to the right. Using improved one-period model of Ronn and Verma (1986) , Duan, Moreau and Sealey (1992) test for the presence of risk shifting. The authors find that only twenty percent of their sample of thirty large U.S. banks exhibits risk-shifting behavior between 1976 and 1986.
Using both single-period and infinite-maturity option models of bank deposit insurance, Hovakimian and Kane (2000) test the risk-shifting hypothesis on a sample of 123 U.S. banks covering the 1985-1994 time period. They find that on average capital regulation did not prevent the sample banks from shifting risk. The evidence of riskshifting is particularly strong for poorly capitalized banks and banks with high ratios of insured deposits to insured debt. This paper analyzes cross-country differences in bank risk-shifting behavior.
Kane (2000) argues that the design of a country's financial safety net should take country-specific factors into account: differences in informational environments and in the enforceability of private contracts in particular. Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) contend that explicit deposit insurance should not be adopted in countries with a weak institutional environment. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) find cross-country evidence that, in countries with weak institutional environments, explicit deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises.
Laeven (2002a) interprets estimates of the fair deposit insurance premium as a proxy for bank risk and shows that this proxy helps to forecast bank distress in different countries. Laeven (2002b) investigates how country-specific and bank-specific features contribute to the value of insurance services. He finds that the opportunity-cost value of deposit insurance services is higher in countries with explicit deposit insurance. The detrimental impact of explicit deposit insurance is largely offset in countries with highquality and well-enforced legal systems.
Using a two-equation regression model introduced by Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) and adapted by Hovakimian and Kane (2000) , this paper investigates how well authorities in 56 countries controlled risk-shifting incentives in recent years. We find evidence of significant risk shifting, on average. Our methods also show substantial variation in the effectiveness of risk control across countries. As hypothesized in Kane (2000), significant portions of this variation are explained by differences in depositinsurance design features and in environmental measures of political repression, economic freedom, and government corruption. Specifically, we find that introduction of explicit deposit insurance exacerbates risk shifting, but that this effect is tempered when loss-control features such as risk-sensitive deposit insurance premiums, coverage limits, and coinsurance are incorporated into the deposit-insurance system. We also find that introducing explicit deposit insurance expands risk-shifting opportunities in environments that are low in political and economic freedom and high in corruption.
Regression results confirm that recent adopters of explicit insurance have done a particularly poor job of managing the value of their deposit guarantees.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the methods used to model bank risk-shifting behavior. Section II describes the sources of our data and our sampling procedures. Section III presents and interprets estimates of risk-shifting incentives. In this section and in Section IV, the analysis focuses on how risk-shifting differs across countries that manage their deposit insurance system in different ways and under different circumstances. Section V summarizes our findings.
I. Role of Alternative Deposit-Insurance Models
This section describes procedures for estimating risk-shifting opportunities at individual banks. Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) show that we can summarize bankrisk shifting incentives in two equations:
In these equations, B is the face value of deposits and other debt, V is the market value of a bank's assets, σ V is the standard deviation of asset returns, and IPP is the "fair" deposit insurance premium per dollar of deposits. The intuition is that a bank sets its asset risk, σ V , as an exogenous variable and that creditors and regulators react to this choice. The slope coefficients in equations (1) and (2) have the following interpretations:
Merton ( imply that bank stockholders can easily extract value from the insurer. However, in practice, the deposit-insurance contract conveys loss-control powers to the put holder that permit a conscientious insurer to monitor and control its risk exposure in client banks.
Risk-sensitive capital requirements modify the net benefits of risk-taking by introducing penalties that enter the relationship between B/V and σ V with a negative sign.
Hence, equation (1) provides a way to estimate whether or not regulatory and market discipline forces a bank to increase its capital enough to compensate creditors and guarantors for increases in asset volatility. A negative α 1 would imply that risk-sensitive capital regulation and complementary market discipline succeed in negating a bank's option-induced benefits from increased leverage.
Given the external discipline a bank faces, the fair premium, IPP, measures whether and how asset volatility influences the value of the implicit and explicit government guarantees that are imbedded in the bank's stock price. To fully neutralize risk-shifting incentives, disciplinary penalties and the induced decline in B/V must be large enough to fully offset whatever increase in IPP would otherwise be generated by a higher σ V . Empirically, a non-positive β 1 would indicate that the risk-shifting incentives were fully neutralized.
Thus, for market and regulatory pressure to consistently discipline and potentially neutralize risk-shifting incentives, two conditions must be met:
Capital increases with volatility:
Guarantee value does not rise with volatility: β 1 ≤ 0.
None of the variables featured in equations (1) and (2) is directly observable.
However, Marcus and Shaked (1984) show how to use option-based models of deposit insurance to track these variables synthetically. Because unobservable expectations play a central role in term-structure and asset-pricing theories, running regressions on synthetic data sets is a common practice in finance. Such experiments test substantive hypotheses about asset valuation jointly with the hypothesis that the synthetic observations are unbiased estimates of the true or "natural" variables. We cannot rule out the possibility that measurement error and simultaneous-equation bias account for some of our results. These concerns make robustness testing doubly important.
The first step in the Marcus-Shaked procedure obtains tracking values for V and σ V by numerical methods. These values are then used to estimate IPP as the value of a put option on bank assets. The procedure begins by solving the call-option formula for equity, E. The last step uses Îto's lemma to link σ V to E, V and σ E (the instantaneous standard deviation of equity returns) by means of equation (5):
To establish whether inferences are robust to differences in how forbearance is modeled, we conducted regressions using estimates of V, σ V , and IPP derived from three different models of deposit-insurance option value.
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The first model follows Merton (1977) in portraying deposit insurance as a singleperiod European put option on the bank's assets. This model treats bank equity as the sum of a dividend-unprotected European call option and the present value of the dividends distributed before the next audit. The bank's debt is assumed to mature in one year, which is also the assumed exercise date for the insurer. The model expresses the value of a bank's equity, E, and the value of the fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, as:
In (6) and (7), δ is the fraction of bank assets distributed at each interim dividend date to stockholders, T is the number of interim dividend payments, N(x i ) states the probability that the variate value x is ≤ x i , given that x is distributed with zero mean and unit variance. (2000):
The third model also appears in Hovakimian and Kane (2000) . It assigns stockholder benefits from forbearance only to banks that actually experience a capital shortfall. This model suppresses the forbearance benefit (1-ρ)BN(x 2 ) for solvent banks.
The value of a bank's equity becomes:
These models fix ρ at either 1.0 or 0.97 for every country at every date. Although one might usefully experiment with other specifications, the policy implications of our regression tests prove relatively insensitive to this parameter. Pennacchi (1987a and b) shows that, by counterfactually presuming prompt and complete insolvency resolution, single-period models of IPP tend to understate the benefits that government guarantees convey to bank stockholders. In exploring riskshifting opportunities and authorities' ability to control them, this bias promises to increase the power of regression tests based on Merton's minimal-forbearance model.
II. Sample Selection and Data
The paper uses annual data from 1991 through 1999. Standard t-tests indicate that the EI subsample is characterized by significantly higher leverage but significantly lower return volatility. Although mean IPP proves lower in the EI subsample, the differences in leverage and volatility broadly offset each other, so that the difference in premiums is not significant. For each subsample, the mean values of leverage and return volatility vary only slightly across the three models.
However, as one might expect, how forbearance is modeled does importantly affect the estimated value of deposit insurance guarantees.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) argue that many of the countries that adopted deposit insurance in the 1990s lacked an appropriate institutional infrastructure and failed to compensate for imperfections in their contracting environments. For the subset of countries that introduced EI during the observation period, columns (3) and (4) in Table   II compare results experienced under implicit and explicit regimes. The explicit-regime subsample shows significantly more leverage and insignificantly higher return volatility.
However, fair deposit insurance premiums are significantly higher under the EI regimes than under the preceding implicit regimes. For countries introducing EI during the 1990s, banks show an increase rather than a decrease in return volatility and a significantly and dramatically higher mean IPP. This indicates that regulatory discipline did a poor job of replacing the depositor discipline that EI displaced. Table III 
III. The Effects of Deposit Insurance on Risk-Shifting Behavior
A. Benchmark Runs
In this section, we examine the effectiveness of risk-shifting controls by expanding regressions (1) and (2) to combine bank-specific fixed effects with particular deposit-insurance design features. Likelihood-ratio and Hausman tests support the fixedeffects specification over either a random-effects specification or a specification that dispenses with bank-specific effects. Because the Merton and Hovakimian-Kane models achieve much the same results, we report benchmark estimates for the Merton and RonnVerma specifications only.
Tables IV and V let us compare results for four versions of regressions (1) and (2).
In each 1. How strongly is bank leverage disciplined?
2. Do officials generate enough supervisory and regulatory pressure to offset the private discipline government guarantees displace?
The significantly negative estimates for α 1 confirm that, on balance across the sample, regulatory capital requirements and private market pressure did generate riskrestraining discipline. However, the significantly positive β 1 value in the first column of Panel B tells a sadder story. It implies that on average outside restraints on bank risktaking failed to neutralize risk-shifting incentives.
Column (2) estimates an expanded version of regressions (1) and (2). It interacts σ V with a zero-one dummy variable for the presence of explicit insurance: the "EI Dummy." The significantly positive values found for this slope-shift parameter in the B/V regressions indicate that outside discipline declines when explicit deposit insurance lessens private policing activity. In the IPP regressions, the effect of explicit deposit insurance on risk shifting is insignificant both in Tables IV and V . However, in the minimal-forbearance Merton model (Table IV) , the perverse coefficient on the EI dummy in the IPP regression is substantially smaller.
Columns (3) and (4) further expand the regressions to allow risk-mitigating features of deposit-insurance design also to shift the σ V slope coefficient. The first experiment interacts a dummy variable that is set to one if deposit insurance premiums are risk-sensitive, and is zero otherwise. The regression experiments reported in column (4) look at two additional interactions. These experiments introduce dummy variables for the existence of coinsurance and limits on the size of insured balances. The results show that the extent of subsidization depends critically on deposit insurance design. In both the leverage and the IPP regressions, coefficient estimates for explicit deposit insurance are significantly positive, but coefficient estimates for all three interacted risk-control features prove significantly negative. This indicates that contractual controls designed to reduce bank risk-shifting incentives are at least partially successful.
The differences observed are economically significant. For example, the results in column (4) of Table VI show that a percentage-point increase in asset volatility σ V generates a 16 basis-point increase in IPP in countries without EI and a 26 basis-point increase in countries that adopt EI but refrain from introducing any risk-mitigating design features. On average, increases in σ V have no effect on IPP when a country adopts all three risk-mitigating features.
B. How does risk-shifting change when a country adopts explicit insurance?
The insignificance of the interacted EI Dummy in column (2) of the IPP regressions in Tables IV and V may reflect differences in economic and political maturity between countries that adopted EI years ago and those that adopted it only recently. In this subsection, we focus on the subsample of 351 observations drawn from countries that installed explicit insurance during 1991-99. The analysis seeks to assess the quality of risk control in these countries in terms of the pattern of shifts in α 1 and β 1 observed in the post-adoption era.
The results, reported in 
IV. How risk-shifting is affected by specific country characteristics
A. Differences in Risk-Shifting Across Environments
In countries where political and economic freedoms are low and government corruption is high, households and firms should be reluctant to entrust their deposits to opaque banks. In these circumstances, agents that become depositors are apt to insist on information flows and deterrent rights sufficient to police and price the risk exposure banks pass through to them. Kane (2000) argues that, in low freedom/high corruption countries, introducing explicit deposit insurance is apt to displace more private discipline than government regulators may reasonably be expected to generate in its stead.
Tables VII through IX test this hypothesis with data derived from the Merton model. 8 The tests investigate the extent to which coefficients of equations (1) and (2) differ across subsamples of countries whose institutional environments differ in specified ways. In each table, observations have been ranked and grouped into subsamples according to the strength of a particular measure of the character of a country's financial contracting environment. Each experiment is limited to countries for which the particular measure is available. In every panel, the σ V coefficient benchmarks the risk-shifting opportunities that exist in the absence of explicit insurance, while the EI shift dummy estimates the adjustment in opportunities occurring in countries that have adopted EI. Table VII investigates the effect of differences in political freedom using a threeway partition developed by Freedom House. Because this index is widely available, this experiment includes almost every observation studied in Tables IV and V. In the leverage regressions, the coefficients show that, as freedom declines, private discipline tends to increase and so does the extent to which it is displaced by EI. The IPP regressions indicate that risk-shifting opportunities exist even without EI, except in the economies that show the least amount of political freedom. Again, the effect of introducing EI grows as freedom declines.
Table VIII partitions the 1533 observations for which the Economic Freedom index exists. The "free" subsample includes all countries whose score on the index equaled or exceeded the median value of 2.3. Results differ sharply between the two environments. In strong (i.e., "free") contracting environments, explicit insurance strengthens rather than undermines private risk-shifting discipline. However, and as we found in Table VII , in poor contracting environments, EI expands banks' opportunities to shift risk. 2000) shows that in countries for which accounting standards have been indexed, the CP correlates strongly with the informativeness of accounting records. CP may also correlate positively with a government's capacity to collect taxes. Countries are divided according to whether CP falls short of or exceeds 5, the midpoint of the index range. In both regressions, benchmark discipline is greater in more-corrupt and less-transparent environments, and explicit insurance expands risk-shifting opportunities in highcorruption environments. In low-corruption countries, while EI exerts no significant effect on leverage discipline, its presence does serve to limit the size of the fair insurance premium.
That explicit insurance arrangements control risk-shifting only in strong contracting environments accords with empirical evidence on how explicit insurance affects the probability of financial crisis as summarized in Demirgüç- Kunt and Kane (2002) . Tables VII to IX support these authors' contention that governments should repair weaknesses in their contracting environments before trying to establish an explicit deposit insurance system. The differences we observe continue to be economically significant. For example, a percentage-point increase in asset volatility σ V generates a 16 basis-point increase in IPP in corrupt countries, but only a 10 basis-point increase in IPP in countries that are less corrupt.
As a robustness test, Table X investigates whether we can incorporate depositinsurance design features and potentially collinear country characteristics into summary regressions. In both the leverage and IPP equations, results confirm the patterns found for individual deposit-insurance features in Tables IV to VI . However, the disruptions we observe in coefficient magnitudes from specification to specification support the hypothesis that unfavorable country characteristics adversely influence deposit-insurance design.
Because the coverage of individual indices must overlap, the final catchall regressions must be run over a particularly small subsample. The catchall IPP regression implies that when we control for levels of political repression, corruption, and restrictions on economic freedom at the same time, EI strongly expands risk-shifting and coinsurance and coverage limits significantly reduce it. While economic freedom drops out of the catchall fair-premium regression, political repression promotes benchmark risk-shifting and integrity in government curtails it.
B. Two-step regression model with self-selection
It seems likely that the coefficient estimates found for deposit insurance design features in Tables IV and V The results support the hypothesis of sample-selection bias, since the coefficient on Heckman's lambda is significant in all but one specification. However, taking account of selection affects only one policy implication: risk-sensitive premiums lose statistical significance in the IPP regression. However, the sample size in these runs is less than half of that employed in Table 4 . Because this increases the standard error of each test, it makes it harder to reject the null.
C. Switching Regression Model with Unknown Sample Separation
This section uses a switching regression model with unknown sample separation (Maddala, 1983) to test the hypothesis that risk-shifting incentives vary with the strength of a country's institutional environment. The switching model has three equations: 
Equations (12) and (13) are risk-control equations that characterize the behavior of banks in the alternate regimes. Equation (14) 
where φ(.) is the density function and Φ(.) is the cumulative of the normal distribution.
The selection equations model institutional strength more plausibly than the catchall leverage and premium regressions presented in Table X . Every country characteristic receives the same sign in both equations. Political repression and corruption each weaken the contracting environment. Although economic repression is found to strengthen controls on bank leverage, its effect on net risk shifting is only marginally significant.
The risk-control equations confirm our previous findings. In weak contracting environments, background controls are stronger, and introducing explicit insurance significantly undermines environmental controls. In strong environments, explicit insurance improves leverage control though, on balance, the extent of risk shifting does not change significantly.
D. Regression Results by Geographic Region
As a final sensitivity test, we estimate the parsimonious risk-control equations featured in Tables XII and XIII In the fair premium regressions, the σ v coefficient may be interpreted as a measure of the strength of implicit guarantees. On this reading, expectations of depositor bailouts are extremely high in Eastern Europe and Latin America and moderately high in Asia and Africa.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Modern finance theory stresses that depositors and other creditors must mitigate incentives for opportunistic behavior by bank managers, owners, and borrowers. To bond their willingness to behave nonopportunistically, banks must convey to depositors a degree of informational transparency and an appropriate set of deterrent rights. Because individual efforts to monitor and police bank risk-taking exhibit wasteful overlaps, efficiency demands that depositor oversight be supplemented by some centralized program of monitoring and control. This centralized program must be able to establish, enforce, and dynamically readjust protocols for verification, disclosure, truth-telling, promise-making, promise-keeping, and conciliation.
In practice, risk-control protocols are imbedded in a financial safety net erected and managed by government officials. The ideal safety net is one that efficiently mitigates the particular monitoring and policing difficulties that present themselves in the contracting environment of a given country. These difficulties are apt to vary with informational, ethical, legal, and economic subcultures that govern the design and enforcement of financial contracts.
Public-choice theory recognizes that officials' incentives differ in important ways from those of private creditors. To persuade safety-net managers to make socially optimal choices, taxpayers must be able to observe and protect their stake in regulatory activities.
This paper investigates how well authorities in 56 different countries have restrained bank risk-shifting incentives in recent years. Results show that the effectiveness of private and governmental controls on bank leverage and depositinsurance subsidies varies across contracting environments in predictable ways.
In any country, explicit deposit insurance threatens to displace more private discipline than official oversight can generate. In strong contracting environments, officials usually manage to avoid this result. Significant portions of the variation in the effectiveness of risk control are explained by differences in political climate, economic freedom, and government corruption. Regressions incorporating these environmental factors are sensitive to model specification, but they indicate on balance that explicit deposit insurance expands risk-shifting opportunities in poor contracting environments.
Our data show that the displacement of private discipline is reduced in systems that impose appropriate combinations of loss-sharing rules, risk-sensitive premiums, and coverage limits. Unfortunately, in poor contracting environments, explicit deposit insurance has an unhealthy appeal to policymakers. Regression results confirm that recent adopters of explicit insurance have done a particularly poor job of replacing the depositor discipline that explicit insurance displaced. where government corruption is high and economic and political freedom is low find it difficult to adopt and enforce appropriate restraints. Table IV Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control, Using the Merton model with minimal forbearance
Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank's leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premium, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σ V , and particular deposit-insurance design features. B is the face value of a bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of a bank's assets. Regression input comes from the Merton single-period model of deposit with minimal forbearance. The sample consists of 2,255 observations covering risk-shifting behavior from 1991 to 1999. Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5%, and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively.
Panel A. Leverage regressions.
(1) Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank's leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σ V , and particular deposit-insurance design features. B is the face value of a bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of a bank's assets. Regression input comes from the adapted RV model of deposit insurance with forbearance. The sample consists of 2,255 observations covering risk-shifting behavior from 1991 to 1999.
Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively.
(1) (1) Table XI Evidence of Risk-Shifting Control, generated from the minimal-forbearance Merton model allowing for self-selection Fixed-effects regressions using Heckman's (1976 Heckman's ( , 1978 two-step method relating a bank's leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σ V , and particular deposit-insurance design features. B is the face value of a bank's debt, including deposits. V is the market value of a bank's assets. The dependent variable of the first-stage Probit model is a dummy variable that indicates whether the design feature is selected or not.
As design features we consider risk-sensitive premiums (column 1), coinsurance (column 2), and coverage limits (column 3). Regression input for the secondstage regression comes from the minimal-forbearance Merton model of deposit insurance. For comparison purposes, we also report the OLS estimates of the original regression equation (panels B and D) . Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank's leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σ V , and specified deposit-insurance design features: B is the face value of the market value of a bank's assets. Regression input comes from Merton's single-period model of deposit insurance with minimal forbearance. The sample consists of observations in countries for which the included country indices exist. Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank's leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σ V , and specified deposit-insurance design features: B is the face value of the market value of a bank's assets. Regression input comes from Merton's single-period model of deposit insurance with minimal forbearance. The sample consists of observations in countries for which the included country indices exist. Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. Fixed-effects regressions relating a bank's leverage, B/V, and fair deposit insurance premiums, IPP, to the volatility of its return on assets, σ V , and specified deposit-insurance design features: B is the face value of the market value of a bank's assets. Regression input comes from Merton's single-period model of deposit insurance with minimal forbearance. Higher values of political freedom index correspond to less freedom. Higher values of economic freedom index correspond to less freedom. Higher values of corruption index correspond to less corruption. The sample consists of observations in countries for which the included country indices exist. Estimates that differ significantly from zero at 5% and 1% levels are marked *, and **, respectively. 
